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Abstract 
In the first half of the 18th century in India, the trading companies of 
Holland, England and France were the protagonists of a political and 
economic expansion. In this paper, the Author aims to highlight the 
colonial experience of the French governor Joseph-François Dupleix’s in 
Bengal in the 1730s. In particular, the Author wants to refer to the shift 
in the balance of power relations between Europeans and Indians, and 
He wants to highlight a slow and progressive shift of the balance 
towards European players. In fact after the 1730s, progressively, the use 
of force becomes, thanks to the fear it generates, a normal modus 
operandi on the part of the European Companies in India. 
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The 18th century can be considered as the closing phase of the 
Modern age, the last century in which the world system was 
characterised by the fact that Europe was not the economically most 
developed area. And it was precisely from the middle of the 18th century, 
slowly and thanks to its strategic and technological supremacy in the 
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military field, that the West began to take control over, and to 
economically exploit, the rest of the world1. 
In the first half of the 18th century in India, the trading companies of 
Holland, England and France were the protagonists of this political and 
economic expansion2. But the Europeans were not the only actors on the 
Indian scene. After the death of Aurangzeb (1707), the last great Mughal 
emperor, many local potentates had risen in India, making themselves de 
facto independent from Delhi, though formally still recognising the Great 
Mughal’s authority. So the empire, from a centralised monarchy, turned 
into a system of essentially autonomous provinces. Moreover, it had to 
deal with the growing power of the Marathas, who managed to take away 
                     
1 On the variation in the balance of power relations between Europeans and Indians 
during the «colonial age», see: M.H. Fisher, Diplomacy in India, 1526-1858, in H.V. 
Bowen-E. Mancke-J.G. Reid (edited by), Britain's Oceanic Empire. Atlantic and Indian Ocean 
Worlds, c. 1550-1850, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2012, pp. 249-281. 
2 About the Dutch Company (the V.O.C., Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie) see, passim: 
C.R. Boxer, The Dutch Seaborne Empire: 1600-1800, London, Hutchinson & Co, 1965; O. 
Prakash, Precious Metals and Commerce: The Dutch East India company in the Indian Ocean 
Trade, Aldershot, Variorum, 1994; F. Gaastra, The Dutch East India Company. Expansion 
and Decline, Zutphen, Walburg Pers, 2003; P.J.A.N. Rietbergen, De Verenigde Oost-Indische 
Compagnie, 1602-1795: 's werelds eerste multinational tussen commercie en cultuur, Amersfoort, 
Bekking & Blitz, 2012; E.M. Jacobs, Merchant in Asia: The Trade of the Dutch East India 
Company During the Eighteenth Century, Leiden, CNWS Publications, 2006 (original ed., 
Zutphen, 2000). On the policies of the British East India Company (E.I.C.) in the first 
half of the 18th century in particular, see: P. Lawson, The East India Company: A History, 
London-New York, Longman, 1993, passim; A. Wild, The East India Company: Trade and 
Conquest from 1600, London, Harper Collins, 1999, pp. 64-85; P.J. Stern, Company, State, 
and Empire: Governance and Regulatory Frameworks in Asia, in H.V. Bowen-E. Mancke-J.G. 
Reid (edited by), Britain's Oceanic Empire. Atlantic and Indian Ocean Worlds, c. 1550-1850, 
op. cit., pp. 130-150; H.V. Bowen-J. McAleer-R.J. Blyth, Monsoon Traders: The Maritime 
World of the East India Company, London, National Maritime Museum, 2011, passim. 
About the French Compagnie des Indes see, passim: P. Haudrère, La compagnie franc ̧aise des 
Indes au XVIIIe sie ̀cle, 2 voll., Paris, Les Indes savantes, 2005 (second ed.); D.C. 
Wellington, French East India Companies: A Historical Account and Record of Trade, Lanham, 
Hamilton Books, 2006; C. Manning, Fortunes à faire. The French in Asian Trade: 1719-48, 
Aldershot, Variorum, 1996; I. Ray, The French East India Company and the Trade of the 
Indian Ocean: A Collection of Essays, with an introd. by L. Subramanian, New Delhi, 
Munshiram Manoharlal, 1999. 
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from Delhi’s control many rich districts in the Gangetic plain (even 
though the Marathas themselves were fragmenting into many conflicting 
family groups)3. 
The interest of the European seafaring powers in the Indian 
subcontinent grew manifold in the first decades of the 18th century, 
although such political instability greatly affected the relations between 
the Officials of the trading companies and the Indians4. In point of fact, 
to the Indian princes, all Western merchants were equally of little 
importance, since the Europeans did not have any political or military 
clout5. 
 
At this time the political use of force with the objective of generating 
a sense of fear in the rivals (especially in the trading rivals) was common 
among all the players, Indian and European, although the dominance of 
Asian principalities was evident. In this paper, I intend to highlight the 
colonial experience of Joseph-François Dupleix’s in Bengal in the 1730s. 
In particular, I will refer to the shift in the balance of power relations 
between Europeans and Indians, and I will highlight a slow and 
progressive shift of the balance towards European players. After the 
                     
3 See, J.F. Richards, The Mughal Empire, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993, 
pp. 253-281; M.D. Faruqui, The Princes of the Mughal Empire, 1504-1719, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2012, pp. 275-308; S. Gordon, The Marathas (1600-1818), 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993, passim. 
4 On the European rivalries in India see, in general: H. Furber, Rival Empires of Trade in 
the Orient, 1600-1800, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1976; and P. Emmer-
F. Gaastra (edited by), The Organization of Interoceanic Trade in European Expansion, 1450-
1800, Aldershot, Variorum, 1996. In particular, about the Anglo-French rivalry, see: F. 
Crouzet, La guerre économique franco-anglaise au XVIIIe siècle, Paris, Fayard, 2008, pp. 331-
339. 
5 A Jesuit well acquainted with the subcontinent wrote most effectively, at the 
beginning of the 18th century: «The Indians regard the Europeans as disgraceful and 
contemptible people»; Father Martin’s letter to Father Le Gobien, Madurai, 1 June 
1700, quoted by M. Vaghi, L’Idea dell’India nell’Europa moderna (secoli XVII-XX), Milano-
Udine, Mimesis, 2012, p. 23. 
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1730s the use of fear against the Indian rivals, therefore, becomes an 
important political instrument even for the European trading companies. 
Dupleix is the most famous governor of French Indies6, the earliest 
of the so-called European Nawabs, and the man from whom the more 
famous Robert Clive learned that to conquer the subcontinent was a 
feasible enterprise, adopting him as his model. The term nabobism was 
created for Dupleix, to describe the complex game of interference in, 
and collusion with, the political power of Indian princes initiated by the 
French Governor since the 1740s7. 
By now it is generally accepted that the idea of a territorial expansion 
at the expense of the Indian princedoms, with the concurring political 
                     
6 About Joseph-François Dupleix (1697-1763), Director of French Bengal factory of 
Chandernagore (1731-1741), and  then Governor of Pondicherry (1741-1754), the 
French chief town in India, see: M. Vaghi, Joseph-François Dupleix e la prima espansione 
europea in India: 'Le trône du Grand Mogol tremble au seul bruit de votre nom' , Milano, Unicopli, 
2008, pp. 55-138. Dupleix’s published biographies are many, but often rather outdated. 
I’ll cite therefore only those I regard as more significant: A. Martineau, Dupleix et l’Inde 
française: 1749-1754, 4 voll., Paris, Société d’éditions géographiques, maritimes et 
coloniales, 1920-1928; P. Cultru, Dupleix ses plans politiques, sa disgrâce, Paris, Hachette, 
1901; and the only modern, albeit secondary, work, M. Vigié, Dupleix, Paris, Fayard, 
1993. The work of the former curator of the Madras record office on the «founding 
fathers» of the British raj over India is quite interesting: H.H. Dodwell, Dupleix and 
Clive. The Beginning of Empire, London, Methuen, 1920. 
7 S.A. Wolpert, A New History of India, Oxford-New York, Oxford University Press, 
1977, p. 175. The term nabobism describes, among other things, the behaviour of some 
European colonisers who would imitate the customs and the usages of Indian princes 
with aiming at a more effective control over the populations they were administering, 
accustomed to being ruled in a more «ceremonial» way than the one generally prevailing 
in European States. For sure, Dupleix did not overlook the need of adapting himself to 
the traditional usages of Deccan, but his nabobism is certainly of a political nature and 
not out of fashion, so to speak: «The ‘game’ Dupleix embarked upon has come to be 
called ‘nabobism’, the English corruption of the Mughal title nawab». But the meaning 
of the mangling of the title of nawab more widespread in European literature and 
customs from the middle of the 19th century – which defines by the term nabobs the 
colonial administrators who became immensely rich thanks to their Indian service («to 
be as rich as a nabob») – has nothing to do with Dupleix. On the relations between 
Dupleix and Clive, and on the policy of the so-called nabobism, see: Vaghi, Joseph-François 
Dupleix e la prima espansione europea in India, op.cit., pp. 48-54. 
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interference in their internal affairs, was worked out by the «men on the 
spot» (administrators and military officials), not by the European Courts. 
Under this respect French Governor J.F. Dupleix is a paramount figure; 
he was the first to envisage and to put into practice a European 
territorial expansion in India, on behalf of France, albeit in a limited and 
ephemeral way. He was stopped at first by his recall to the motherland in 
1754, and then by the decisive French defeat in the Seven Years war, 
which eventually opened the way to English penetration in the Indian 
subcontinent8. 
 
It is undeniable that Dupleix, whose reflections on the European 
policy in the East Indies started as early as the 1730s, was a forerunner.  
In the first half of the 18th century, as a matter of fact, the importance 
of obtaining large territories overseas was generally not understood in 
France, if the opinion expressed – among other commentators – by 
Montesquieu on colonial adventures is to be given credence9. In the eyes 
of the famous philosophe, then, only the Indian and Chinese settlements 
(providing the exotic goods that fashion had made indispensable) and, 
above all, the plantation colonies of the Antilles (which had made the 
                     
8 On Dupleix’s move from «traditional» merchant colonialism to a policy of 
interference in Indian politics and of territorial conquests, see: Vaghi, Joseph-François 
Dupleix e la prima espansione europea in India, op.cit., pp. 150-174. About the crisis of 
French power in India after 1763, see: G. Mansingh, French Military Influence in India, 
New Delhi, Knowledge World, 2006, pp. 9-25; S.P. Sen, The French in India (1763-1815), 
New Delhi, M. Manoharlal, 1971 (second ed.), pp. 218-415; S. Das, Myths and Realities of 
French Imperialism in India, New York, Peter Lang, 1992, pp. 129-242; P. Le Tréguilly, Les 
aventuriers, in P. Le Tréguilly-M. Morazé (sous la direction de), L’Inde et la France, deux 
siècles d’histoire commune (XVIIe-XVIIIe siècles), Paris, CNRS éd., 1995, pp. 51-63. 
9 «L’effet ordinaire des colonies est d’affaiblir les pays d’où on les tire sans peupler ceux 
où on les envoie […]. Les princes ne doivent donc point songer à peupler de grands 
pays par des colonies […]. Mais, quand ces colonies réussiraient, au lieu d’augmenter la 
puissance [du prince], elles ne feraient que la partager; au moins qu’elles n’eussent très 
peu d’étendue, comme sont celles que l’on envoie pour occuper quelque place pour le 
commerce»; Montesquieu, Lettres persanes, critical edition by J. Starobinski, Paris, 
Gallimard, 1973, lettre CXXI, p. 271. 
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fortune of the French Atlantic ports in the context of the triangular 
trade) were useful to France. A colonisation of the Mughal empire could 
not, on the contrary, even be taken into consideration, in Montesquieu’s 
opinion, both because of the vastness of its territories and the great 
numbers of its subjects (to whom he attributes a civilisation as worthy as 
the European one), and because of its climate, totally unfit for European 
habits and unhealthy, according to a classic 18th century stereotype. 
Showing how deep-rooted among a great part of the French ruling 
class and public opinion was the Jean-Baptiste Colbert-inspired utilitarian 
conception of colonisation (so much so that even a refined esprit, such as 
Montesquieu was, was influenced by it), the Encyclopédie, still in 1765, 
maintained that colonies were founded by the mother country only to 
the exclusive economic benefit of the mother country: the grandeur of 
France did definitely take a less relevant place than economic interest10. 
Also the common people were on the whole uninterested in overseas 
adventures, often seen as a last refuge for those left with no other means 
of subsistence (as later Albert Duchêne underlined in his important work 
on French colonial policy)11. To the middle of the 18th century France, 
colonies were of secondary importance; while to their rivals on the other 
side of the Channel their importance was paramount12. 
                     
10 About the conception of colonisation in India by Colbert, see: A. Ray, The Merchant 
and the State: The French in India, 1666-1739, 2 vols., New Delhi, Munshiram Manoharlal, 
2004, vol. I, pp. 13-17; H. Deschamps, Les méthodes et les doctrines coloniales de la France, 
Paris, Colin, 1953, pp. 34-44; P. Haudrère, La Compagnie des Indes, in P. Le Tréguilly-M. 
Morazé (sous la direction de), L’Inde et la France, deux siècles d’histoire commune, op. cit., pp. 
11-21. 
11 «Pour la masse, les colonies demeurèrent des pays embrumés de légendes, vers 
lesquels l’esprit d’aventure seul pouvait entraîner de braves gens, s’ils n’étaient très 
pauvres ou très naïfs»; A. Duchêne, La politique coloniale de la France: le Ministère des colonies 
depuis Richelieu, Paris, Payot, 1928, p. 90. 
12 «Jamais, au XVIIIe siècle […], les colonies n’ont été d’importance vitale pour la 
France au même titre qu’elles l’étaient, à la même époque déjà, pour la Grande-Bretagne 
[…]. De 1688 à 1815, les guerres successives où l’Angleterre fut entraînée n’auraient 
Massimiliano Vaghi 
 
92 
The military victories achieved by Dupleix in the first Carnatic War 
(1745-1748) did cause, it is true, a sort of colonial euphoria13 in France, 
fed by the hope of seeing the trade profits increase exponentially. But the 
dream of colonial grandeur on the part of the Compagnie des Indes and the 
trust that public opinion – both Parisian and of the Atlantic ports 
involved in the trade with the subcontinent – had in Dupleix ended up 
crumbling quite fast. The absence of the expected revenues coming from 
the control of the aldée14 allotted to the Governor of Pondicherry by the 
                                                
jamais pour elle qu’un but jamais oublié: créer ou consolider un empire colonial»; 
Duchêne, La politique coloniale de la France, op. cit., p. 93. In particular, about the 
importance of the colonies in the 18th century France, see also: J. Jennings, Revolution 
and the Republic: A History of Political Thought in France since the Eighteenth Century, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2011, pp. 147-152. On this subject, instead, T.R. Metcalf 
highlights England’s precocious «imperial» designs: «The British idea of themselves as 
an imperial people charged with the governance of others, had its origin in the 
discoveries and conquest of the Tudor state in the sixteenth century» (T.R. Metcalf, 
Ideologies of the Raj, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1994, p. 2). Some authors 
maintain – rightly, in my opinion – that the first British empire arose in opposition to 
the «insufferable monopoly» held by Spain on Atlantic traffic, rather than against 
France. Only later on, with the wars of the 18th century, the rivalry for world hegemony 
gradually, not suddenly, growingly involved the other rising power, France. On this see, 
among many other works, the efficacious summary by: A. Hugon, Rivalités européennes et 
hégémonie mondiale, XVIe-XVIIIe siècle, Paris, Colin, 2002, pp. 173-175. On English 
colonial policy between 1660 and 1776, see: K.E. Knorr, British Colonial Theories: 1570-
1850, London, Frank Cass & C., 1963, pp. 68-105. On the British perception of the 
importance of the colonies in the Walpolean era, see: D. Armitage, The Ideological Origins 
of the British Empire, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000, pp. 170-198. 
13 Among these military victories the French conquest of Madras (September 21st, 
1747) and the victorious defence of Pondicherry, vainly besieged for almost three 
months by the English admiral Boscawen (August-October 1748), stand out. These two 
significant victories by Dupleix had a decisive effect on the opinion of the Parisian 
ruling class, which for a time became favourable to the «territorial policy» in India (also 
thanks to the presence of the new Contrôleur Général des Finances, Machault d'Arnouville, 
who substituted in 1747 Orry, who had instead always opposed colonial conquests). On 
this subject, see M. Vaghi, La 'Relation du siège de Pondichéry en forme de journal’ (1748). Un 
episodio chiave della rivalità anglo-francese in India, Milano, CUEM, 2010, pp. 7-35.; and A. 
Martineau, Dupleix, sa vie, son œuvre, Paris, Société d’éditions géographiques, maritimes et 
coloniales, 1931, pp. 102-117. 
14 The French term of aldée is linked in Mughal India to the concept of jagir. Jagir is the 
right to collect and to keep the taxes from a certain territory, bestowed by the Mughal 
authority. Aldée literally means «native village community» (from the Portuguese aldeia, 
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Indian princes15 and the direct intervention of the British government in 
support of its Company, soon frustrated Dupleix’s efforts and 
jeopardised the French presence in India16. 
Even though the French ruling classes and cultural élites were 
generally against military or territorial expansion in India, from the 1730s 
Dupleix realised that the situation in Bengal required a different policy. 
He was worried both because of the dynamism shown by the Dutch 
Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (V.O.C.) and by the East India 
Company, and because of the political insecurity of that rich province of 
the Mughal Empire, an insecurity that was undermining the profits of 
the European Companies. 
Indeed, despite the growing profits – «for most of the East India 
companies were extremely successful and dividends high»17 –, the 
fundamental difference between 1690, when Aurangzeb graciously 
                                                
village), the districts allotted to the Compagnie des Indes by imperial authority or by 
local Nawabs. 
15 French revenues for the most part used to cover the costs of the war, or, in other 
instances, were obtainable only once the princes loyal to France were safely established 
on their thrones. 
16 As the Madras victory in 1746 and the Pondicherry one in 1748 had contributed to 
strengthen in a decisive way the position of Dupleix at the court of Versailles and to 
have his Indian policy approved, the scalding defeat suffered by the troops of the 
Compagnie des Indes at Srirangam (June 12th, 1752) at the hands of Lawrence and Clive 
determined the public condemnation and removal of the French governor of India 
(August 1754). By then Dupleix was seen as a warmonger blinded by his hatred against 
the English, and besides no longer militarily undefeated. Even those – such as Machault 
d'Arnouville – who on principle did not oppose a territorial expansion by the French 
company, were driven to seek for peace, or at least for an agreement, with the English: 
«Il n’était pas question de faire des nouvelles conquêtes qui auraient été plus onereuses qu’utiles…»; 
Aix-en-Provence, ANOM (Archives Nationales d’Outre-Mer), FC (Fonds des 
Colonies), C2-79, Relation de l’expédition de Mahé, s.l., s.d., f. 249. On this subject, see 
again Vaghi, Joseph-François Dupleix e la prima espansione europea in India, op.cit., pp. 139-
145; and Martineau, Dupleix, sa vie, son œuvre, op. cit., p. 179-188 and pp. 275-287. 
17 C. Koninckx, Ownership in East India Company Shipping: Prussia, Scandinavia and the 
Austrian Netherlands in the 18th Century, in Bijdrage tot de internationale maritieme geschiedenis, 
edited by C. Koninckx et alii, Bruxelles, Collectanea maritima, 1988, vol. 4, pp. 33-42 
(quotation from p. 41). 
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granted to the recently defeated English a new decree which authorised 
them to trade in his domains18, and the 1720s and 1730s, when trade was 
regulated by the many different local Nawabs and not from Delhi any 
longer, had the effect of bringing uncertainty and tensions among the 
Europeans operating in Bengal. 
While once upon a time the empire used to acknowledge the 
economic importance of European merchants and granted them – in 
exchange for a share of their profits – an adequate protection both 
against marauders and against any possible abuses committed by local 
officials, by now the disempowered emperors had to be paid for a 
protection they were not any longer able to ensure and for permits that 
held no real say in the empire’s peripheral areas, where the «greed» of 
Mughal bureaucrats had – in the eyes of Europeans – reached such levels 
as to jeopardise the very profits of commercial ventures. 
Actually, as mentioned above, the demise of the great Aurangzeb had 
allowed the rise of many local potentates that became in actual fact 
independent from Delhi, even though they formally continued to 
acknowledge the authority of the Great Mughal, and the empire had de 
facto ceased to be a united State. One can therefore understand why from 
the 1720s local Nawabs stopped applying the extant agreements between 
the Great Mughal and the European companies, gradually placing in 
their stead their own tax legislation – which was not necessarily more 
burdensome towards Westerners, but very often perceived as unfair by 
the Westerners themselves. 
In the correspondence of the famous official of the Compagnie des Indes 
Joseph-François Dupleix, both before and after his nomination as 
director of the Chandernagore settlement, there are quite frequent 
examples of an explicit critique of the greed of Mughal officials in Bengal 
                     
18 I refer to «Child's War», a war between the East India Company and the Mughal 
Empire which lasted from 1686 to 1690. See: J. Keay, India, A History, London, 
HarperCollins, 2000, pp. 372-375. 
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– a greed that favoured, directly or indirectly, an unequal treatment of 
the different European companies there, causing tension among them. 
Dupleix expressed for the first time such fears already in 172719, on his 
first arrival in India. He suspected that the Dutch were trying to bring on 
their side the most important Nawabs, and that they were plotting 
against France in cahoots with the English of the East India Company 
(and the fear of an Anglo-Dutch alliance against France was to stay with 
Dupleix, as we will see, also during his direction at Chandernagore): «The 
Dutch haven’t declared their intentions so openly, but on many 
occasions they didn’t miss the opportunity to show that they bore with 
our near presence only with impatience, as they clearly showed by 
stopping one of our ships coming from Yanaon»20. 
Once attained the highest post at Chandernagore, Dupleix feared that 
the insistence to try to stop the European smugglers and pirates on the 
part of the companies of Holland and England could turn into a kind of 
monopoly on their part, aimed at driving out of India all other European 
nations:  
 
In fact, it is the ships of these four Nations [France, England, Holland 
and Denmark] coming to India without the permission of one of the 
Companies which are to be regarded as interlopers, and which under 
these terms can be taken and arrested […]; but as for those that could 
come under the Polish and the Swedish flag [...], they cannot be regarded 
as such, since they carry a Commission by the Sovereigns who allow 
                     
19 Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale (BN), Département des manuscrits, manuscrits 
occidentaux, NAF (Nouvelles acquisitions françaises), 9357, Mémoire sur les établissements de la 
Compagnie et sur le commerce dans les Indes Orientales, Pondicherry, 8 October 1727, f. 48r-
74r. 
20 Ibidem, ff. 57v-58r. 
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them to come to India, and we cannot have these ships attacked or 
captured21. 
 
But the most important reflexions by Dupleix concerned the political 
relations between the players on the Bengali stage – Europeans and 
Maures (Indian Muslim officers) – and his awareness of the weakness of 
the trading companies. 
On the one hand Dupleix informed his superiors in France that he 
had obtained the renewal of the imperial authorisation to trade in the 
suba (imperial province) – «as the conclusion of our embassy to the 
Nawab [Shuja Khan], from whom we have got the paravana, from now 
on we are at ease and our merchandise is sold without impediment»22; on 
the other hand he highlighted the vexations that also the Dutch and the 
English had to suffer, since the Nawab «has demanded from them the 
payment of 130,000 rupees»23. 
Certainly, Dupleix was well aware of the Europeans’ political and 
military weakness in India, and had an idea of its causes: «This affair will 
be settled like all the others by giving in to the Nawab’s demands. These 
two nations [Holland and England] well deserve to be treated this way: 
they have themselves shown the Maures how to do it […]. The Maures, 
the Rajahs, have absolutely no other aim than to pillage the 
Europeans»24. 
In that same 1732, Dupleix renewed his call for the central 
government in Delhi to intervene against the administrations in the 
                     
21 BN, FR (Manuscrits français), 8979, Dupleix’s letter to the Contrôleur Général (Orry), 
Chandernagore, 30 November 1732, ff. 68v-71r. 
22 BN, FR, 8979, Dupleix’s letter to the Directors of the Compagnie des Indes, 
Chandernagore, 14 January 1732, ff. 21r-23r. From 1725 to 1739 the Mughal Governor 
of the Bengal province was Shuja Khan, Nawab of  Murshidabad. Generally, in Mughal 
India, the term paravana – from the Persian farmām – denotes a royal or governmental 
decree promulgated in the name of the ruler or another person (e.g., prince, princess, 
governor) holding partial elements of sovereignty. 
23 Ibidem. 
24 Ibidem. 
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periphery, which were interested in exacting the customs duty to their 
exclusive benefit, damaging both the French and the Mughal. 
Director Dupleix proposed to pay a lump sum of 40,000 rupees 
directly to the padishah (the Great Mughal), in order to obtain free trade 
for the French in the Bengali suba, conferring to them the exemption 
from the duties to local officials (as the Dutch already were doing): «We 
[the French and the English] are the only two nations that have not got 
this concession, which does not cause any loss whatsoever to the King 
[that is, the Great Mughal], since it makes no difference to him whether 
it is us or a Gentil [a Mughal non-Muslim official] paying him his right of 
coinage»25. 
From this November 1732 letter, sent by Dupleix to the marchand 
Forestieri (a sort of ambassador of the French Company to the court of 
Delhi), one can see that it must have been preceded by at least another 
one, in which the director was expounding to his colleague a project for 
a common Anglo-French embassy to the Nawab in order to obtain the 
«droit» that the Dutch already enjoyed – that’s what the we are the only 
nations in the quoted sentence means. 
But Dupleix knew that the «concession» enjoyed by the V.O.C. was in 
reality almost useless, since the Dutch were not strong enough to have it 
enforced. He was indeed reporting the abuses («thyrannies») the 
Europeans were subjected to, and he underscored the fact that the lack 
of any reaction to abuse on the part of the Europeans made the Maures 
regard the Companies as weak subjects that could be freely «squeezed» at 
will, without having to fear any retaliation on their part:  
 
                     
25 BN, FR, 8979, Dupleix’s letter to the marchand Forestieri (in Delhi), Chandernagore, 
11 November 1732, f. 6r/v. 
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Whatever the care I employ to treat with the Maures […], I cannot 
succeed, since all their attention is only set on finding new ways to get 
money from the Europeans […] and they seem to be quite persuaded 
that the Companies of Europe do not care at all about the abuses […] 
they commit every year. Anybody in their place would think the same, 
since they have seen that the vexations they perpetrated against the ships 
Malescot and Pigeon had no consequences, the same as those they 
perpetrated and kept committing daily against the English and the 
Dutch; this inaction on our part encourages them, and I do have reason 
to believe that eventually they will go dangerously too far […]. There is 
no more consideration on their part: the name of European they once 
used with respect has become something laughable to them, and they 
regard us as inexhaustible resources that they can squeeze at will26. 
 
In the past, continued Dupleix, the emperor’s directions were 
enforced by the sovereign’s local representative. Now, on the contrary, 
«the Nawab, who indulges in the worst debaucheries, leaves the care of 
his affairs to a gang of crooks, who on their part only mind to fill their 
own pockets […]. The Nawab himself has pushed the thing up to the 
point of telling me that, if I was not satisfied, we could well leave the 
country, since he did not need us any more than he needed the other 
Europeans»27. 
Thus the Compagnie des Indes, around the year 1730, was facing (as all 
the Europeans did) the serious problem of defending itself from the 
Maures. But the director of the French factory of Chandernagore had 
also worries about the Dutch, the most prominent European power in 
Bengal. 
                     
26 BN, FR, 8979, Dupleix’s letter to the Directors of the Compagnie des Indes, 
Chandernagore, 30 November 1732, ff. 72v-77 r. 
27 Ibidem. 
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Dupleix wanted to avoid for his Company the sad ending suffered by 
the Habsburg trade society (the Ostend Company)28, that had led a 
miserable life in India, mostly caused by the boycott promoted against it 
by the Dutch and by their English allies. 
The hostility of the two seafaring powers against the trading society 
supported by Charles the VI in the context of the Habsburg maritime 
plans29 was more than justified, anyway, since the Ostend Company 
offered legal cover to the traffic of many English and Dutch merchants, 
who were in such a way infringing the monopoly granted to their 
respective national Companies30. Moreover the immediate and strong 
English and Dutch reaction against the activity of the Ostend Company 
is indeed well known: it was exerted both by diplomatic pressures in 
Europe and by an open boycott in India, which Dupleix witnessed, as we 
shall see. 
The vicissitudes of the trading society founded by the Habsburg 
Emperor came in fact to an end by 1727, when Charles the VI, desiring 
to guarantee his daughter Maria Theresa’s succession to his throne, 
bargained the recognition of the Pragmatic Sanction by Holland and 
                     
28 It is important to note that in the 18th century India the smallest European trading 
Company was, without doubt, the Ostend Company, created in 1723 by Emperor 
Charles the VI of Habsburg. It was also the most successful and, as such, the most 
opposed by the rival trading companies. In general see: Koninckx, Ownership in East 
India Company Shipping: Prussia, Scandinavia and the Austrian Netherlands in the 18th Century, 
op. cit., passim. On the birth and development of the Ostend Company see: M. 
Huisman, La Belgique commerciale sous l'empereur Charles VI. La Compagnie d'Ostende: étude 
historique de politique commerciale et coloniale, Bruxelles-Paris, Lamertin-Picard, 1902, pp. 
155-214; and M. Wanner, The Ostend Company as Phenomenon of International Politics in 
1722-1731, in «Prague Papers on the History of International Relations», 2006, pp. 29-
63. 
29 See: M. Wanner, The Establishment of the General Company in Ostend in the Context of the 
Habsburg Maritime Plans, 1714-1723, in «Prague Papers on the History of International 
Relations», 2007, pp. 33-81. 
30 O. Prakash, European Commercial Enterprise in Pre-Colonial India, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1998, passim. 
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England against his pledge to suspend the traffics of the Ostend 
Company for seven years. The Company – which in 1731 lost its 
imperial charter for good – saw its traffic with India shrink to about nil, 
notwithstanding its attempts to circumvent the obstacle by having its 
merchant ships fly a foreign flag or by leasing the ships of the many 
Polish merchants operating in the Indian subcontinent; and it survived as 
a mere financial company up to the time of its final demise in 178531. 
While in the first half of the 18th century in India the relations 
between the agents of the V.O.C., of the Compagnie des Indes and of the 
East India Company saw periods of close cooperation, at times giving 
way to intense commercial rivalry, the treatment meted out to the 
Ostend Company merchants by the other seafaring powers marked for 
sure the top in terms of boycott. 
In the correspondence of the French director of Chandernagore the 
fear that the rivals could join their forces against the French presence in 
Bengal – once the Ostend merchants, who in 1732-33 were operating 
only through intermediaries, had been thrown out for good – surfaces 
quite clearly: 
 
I have put in the letter […] the reflections one has to do on the present 
state of the European nations; they deserve to get the attention of the 
Company, as well as the conduct of the English and the Dutch towards 
us do. The jealousy of these two nations has no limit, and both will do all 
they can to destroy us, each in its turn; last year it was the English, this 
year it is the Dutch; so that we are obliged to respond in turn to them 
[…] with the weak garrison the Company maintains here32. 
 
                     
31 For details of the reasons of the suspension and of the subsequent and final 
suppression of the Ostend Company, see: Huisman, La Belgique commerciale, op. cit., pp. 
404-454. 
32 BN, FR, 8979, Dupleix’s letter to the Directors of the Compagnie des Indes, 
Chandernagore, 14 January 1732, ff. 21r-23r. 
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In Dupleix’s opinion the hostility towards the traffic of the Ostend 
Company and of its intermediaries – «the Poles», as he calls them – does 
neither originate in, nor limit itself to, the leaderships of the Dutch and 
English Companies, but must be a policy pursued by their respective 
governments. To drive the Habsburgs out of India must have been the 
decision of European chancelleries, a fruit of fleeting alliances: 
 
I send you, my Lords, a copy of this letter, where I underlined to him 
[Dupleix is referring to Philibert Orry, the French Contrôleur Général de 
Finances, that is the minister of finances] my worries about the conduct 
that I have to follow on these occasions, and that for my own safety I 
need to get orders from the Court on a matter that concerns the King 
and the treaties of alliance […]. When the English and the Dutch 
attacked the Poles, they did it only because of orders issued by their 
Sovereigns33. 
 
From what has been said it appears that in the middle 1730s Dupleix 
still perceived the rich and powerful merchants of the V.O.C. as the 
main rivals of the French Company. They were regarded – for some 
aspects, quite rightly – as the main actors in the crisis of Portuguese 
trade, in the boycott of the Ostend Company, and ever ready to wreak 
on France a similar miserable destiny: «The Dutch, whose design of 
destroying all the other Companies will never falter»34. 
The Anglo-Dutch naval blockade had catastrophic effects on the 
Ostend Company. Dupleix – who personally never made public the fact 
that he was disturbed by the traffics of the «Ostendais», and who did not 
take part in their expulsion from Bengal – gives a sad report about them 
                     
33 BN, FR, 8979, Dupleix’s letter to the Directors of the Compagnie des Indes, 
Chandernagore, 30 November 1732, ff. 72v-77r. 
34 BN, NAF, 9357, Copy of a letter by Dupleix to the Contrôleur Général (Orry), 
Chandernagore, 31 December 1734, ff. 99r-100r. 
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in a letter to an infrequent correspondent of his: «The factory of the 
Imperials still exists, but in a wretched state, as they have got neither 
money, nor ships, nor even the hope of getting them someday»35. 
The main threat to the interests of the Compagnie des Indes in Bengal 
were the Dutch, then: the V.O.C. was so reckless as to even claim a right 
of inspection on the French ships, on the pretext of verifying whether 
their cargo had, either as the origin or as the destination, the markets 
controlled by the intermediaries to the Austrians. 
At the end of 1733 Dupleix wrote a long letter to Philibert Orry to 
denounce such illegitimate ship inspections – illegitimate since they were 
carried out on ships that had lawfully been authorised to trade, both by 
their own government and by the Mughal authority – and to ask for 
instructions on the conduct he had to follow: 
 
In the month of July, the Dutch have demanded that we showed the 
licences of our ships. Neither the Council, nor I, have judged appropriate to 
consent; and in order to show them that we will resist by force, I gave order to 
the Captain of the Prince de Conty to be prepared to defend the original orders he 
had got. These actions would not have been carried out if the Dutch had not 
been following instructions from their government […]. After this 
confrontation the Dutch have withdrawn the two warships they kept at Coupy, 
and the passage is at present free36. 
 
On the 23 November 1733, therefore, in his letter to «M. le Contrôleur 
Général», Dupleix was explaining his decision to respond by force to the 
Dutch demands, denouncing the bullying by the V.O.C. and informing 
the French minister that he had ordered the captain of the Prince de Conty 
to break the Dutch blockade open by force. 
                     
35 BN, NAF, 9357, Dupleix’s letter to Mr. Loyson, Chandernagore, 19 December 1735, 
f. 107r\v. 
36 ANOM, FC, C2-75, Copy of the letter written to M. le Contrôleur Général by M. 
Dupleix from Chandernagore, 23 November 1733', ff. 87r-88v. 
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Yet this information is contained only in the letter addressed to the 
French government; to his Company – which had an exclusively 
commercial interest, and was strongly against any confrontation with 
other Europeans in the Indian subcontinent – Dupleix only gave the 
information that «the Council of Chinsura […] has demanded that the 
ships entering the Ganges under the French flag show their permits or 
licences»37. 
However, the French Company got to know about Dupleix’s orders 
against the Dutch blockade; in a letter received almost one year later in 
Chandernagore the Company expressed its appreciation of the good 
revenue of the Bengali trade, and approved of Dupleix’s policy, both as 
for his attitude towards the Europeans («polonais» and «suedois», as we 
have seen) unjustly considered «pirates» by the Dutch, and as for his 
decision to respond by force to the unjust Dutch demands: «The 
Company approves [Dupleix’s] attitude to the matter of the interloper 
ships […] signals its satisfaction for the cargoes of the Company’s ships 
[…] approves of the response given by the Council of Chandernagore to 
the envoys of the Council of Chinsura and to their demands to show the 
permits»38. 
In the end, as can be gathered by a «Réponse du Conseil de Chandernagor 
aux demandes des Messieurs les Députés du Conseil de Chinchura»39, Dupleix and 
his Council had managed to have the upper hand in the matter, obtaining 
from the Chinsura Dutch the freedom of navigation for French shipping 
– warships included – and for all the merchants going to Chandernagore. 
The whole question was summarised by Dupleix himself in a letter dated 
                     
37 ANOM, FC, C2-75, Chandernagore Council’s letter to the Auditors and Directors of 
the Compagnie des Indes, Chandernagore, 23 November 1733, ff. 89r-96v. 
38 ANOM, FC, C2-75, Summary (coeval, sl, sd) of a letter by the French Company 
received in Chandernagore, 31 December 1734, ff. 133r-134r. 
39 ANOM, FC, C2-75, Réponse du Conseil de Chandernagor aux demandes des Messieurs les 
Députés du Conseil de Chinchura, Chandernagore, 26 July 1734, f. 139r\v. 
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31 December 1734 to the Contrôleur Général Orry, where the French 
director openly criticises the Dutch for their thirst for power again, 
accusing them of wanting to destroy all the other Companies, and 
highlighting his success in the complex matter: according to Dupleix, the 
role of the Compagnie des Indes as the victim of its European rivals was 
finally over40. 
Many times up to 1740 (when he was elevated to the prestigious 
office of Governor of Pondicherry) Dupleix recalls his laborious work to 
start in Chandernagore an ambitious plan to «strengthen» the Compagnie 
des Indes, that would have been, if accomplished, a source of envy and 
worry for the other European nations in India: «What worries, what 
sleepless nights, what risks I have undertaken and run to make 
Chandernagore worthy of the jealousy of the English and the Dutch, 
who had for her only the most complete contempt before»41. 
Actually, the Dutch harassment did not last for long: as a matter of 
fact, the policy of firmness Dupleix recommended to his government, 
together with the good relations between the French director and the 
new Dutch governor – Jean Albert de Sichtermann, «conseiller des Indes et 
directeur général pour la noble Compagnie de Hollande à Chinchura», who in 1741 
was best man at Dupleix’s wedding42 – soon fostered a peaceful 
cooperation between the two Companies. 
A proof of the friendship between the two European officials and of 
their willingness to peacefully solve the inevitable conflicts between 
those who were, at the end of the day, trade rivals, can be found in a 
letter written by Dupleix in the spring 1735, concerning a French-Dutch 
quarrel about the ownership of a piece of land bordering both their 
                     
40 ANOM, FC, C2-75, Dupleix’s letter to the Contrôleur Général Orry, Chandernagore, 31 
December 1734, ff. 141r-144r. 
41 BN, FR, 8981, Dupleix’s letter to the Auditors and the Directors of the Compagnie des 
Indes, Chandernagore, 25 November 1738, ff. 11r- 20v. 
42 BN, NAF, 9355, Copy of the marriage certificate of the wedding between J.F. 
Dupleix and Jeanne Albert, Chandernagore, 17 April 1741, f. 488r. 
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comptoirs, Chinsura and Chandernagore. In this document, on the one 
hand Dupleix displays a firm attitude in reclaiming the ownership of that 
land for the Compagnie des Indes, on the other hand he advocates a 
peaceful solution of the dispute in accordance with the law, even 
considering the assignment of the contended land. Unfortunately, other 
papers which could throw more light on the matter are not available, but 
this letter gives a good idea of the question: 
 
Mr de la Croix [an official of the French Company] yesterday reported to 
me the claims you say you have on the piece of land in front of your 
park, where you have started to dig up. I believe, Sir, that those who told 
you that that land belonged to your Company were either mistaken, or 
had the design to rouse between our two nations some subjects of 
discussion that I on my part tried to avoid as far as possible […]. I 
cannot forsake the rights of our Company […]: in order to maintain our 
friendship I offer to give you the land that you need […] by the means of 
the deeds and of the other documents used in these circumstances. All 
will be settled according to the rules and every dispute will cease43. 
 
In the 18th century, European merchants in India were generally 
allowed to practice the country trade, the trade «from India to India, 
which spreads not only throughout the Indies, but also to China, to 
Persia, to Tartaria, and throughout the whole Mughal Empire»44. 
Private trade cooperation between European merchants in Bengal 
was also widespread, despite its official prohibition by all the Companies. 
As C. Koninckx reminded us: «This ‘country trade’ was carried on by the 
employees of the various companies, sometime even in collaboration 
                     
43 Paris, Bibliothèque de l’Arsenal (Ars.), ms 4743, Dupleix’s letter to Sichtermann, 
Chandernagore, 13 May 1735, f. 10v-11r. 
44 [M. De Gennes], Mémoire pour le sieur Dupleix contre la Compagnie des Indes, avec pièces 
justificatives, Paris, Le Prieur, 1759, p. 14. 
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with those of rival companies. And yet [it] was, in fact, still not allowed, 
though it was certainly connived at, as the supercargoes themselves were 
often involved too»45. 
The opportunity for the merchants to effect private trade exchanges 
brought Dupleix to found a company to this aim already in 1731, as soon 
as he was nominated director of the Chandernagore settlement. Among 
its shareholders were some high-ranking officials of the French 
Company, and some among the highest representatives of the rival 
trading companies of the French, despite the fact that this was officially 
forbidden by his Company: the English governor of Calcutta, 
Stackhouse, the Dutch Sichtermann, and the representative of the 
Habsburgs’ Company at Bankibazar, Schonamille. 
Dupleix’s commitment to these trade activities was quite evident 
already in this period: for instance, in less than four months (September 
to December 1731) he equipped no less than six merchant ships, which 
sailed from Chandernagore towards Pegu, the Maldives and the Western 
coast of India (where in Malabar rich pepper plantations and flourishing 
markets were to be found): «I put the cake in the oven, I don’t know if I 
will be successful»46. 
Dupleix’s cautious optimism turned out to be well-founded: the year 
1731 came to a close with great profits for him and for all his business 
partners, thanks to the fact that not a single cargo had been lost. 
In order to send their revenues to France, Dupleix and the other 
officials of the French Company would use the merchant ships returning 
to their ports in the motherland. These operations were carried out 
                     
45 Koninckx, Ownership in East India Company Shipping, op. cit., p. 39. 
46 BN, FR, 8979, Dupleix’s letter to Lenoir (Governor of Pondicherry in 1731 and 
immediate superior to Dupleix), Chandernagore, 25 September 1731, f. 1r. One can 
infer from this letter that it had been preceded by at least another one, of which 
unfortunately no trace is left. As shown by what Dupleix wrote: «J’ai eu l’honneur de vous 
écrire par deux brigantines que je compte bien arrivés» («I have the honour to write to you 
through two brigantines which I trust have already arrived well»). 
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sometimes legally, and other times illegally. For small sums they would 
strictly abide to the legal ways: one would personally deliver the bills of 
exchange or the cash (usually gold pagodas) to the ship’s captain, and once 
in France he would declare the shipload to the customs officer. This 
latter would withhold the dues, and would deliver the rest to the official 
of the Company in charge. 
For greater amounts of money, instead, more refined, and illegal, 
operations would be conducted, with the help, again, of the captains of 
Europe-bound ships. The common usage was to have the goods arrive 
to Europe on foreign ships. Dupleix had of course connections that 
allowed him to perform this work of total tax evasion: indeed, «his 
friendship with Governor Sichtermann allows him on the contrary to act 
in full illegality, having gold ingots and different Eastern currencies 
brought to France through Holland»47. 
Thanks to the complicity of the director of Chinsura, Dupleix would 
manage to send to France even the precious Bengali fabrics, which, 
despite the ban on their trade and sale as a form of protection of the 
fledging French textile industry, were nonetheless in high demand even 
amongst people connected to the government and to the Court. 
Dupleix’s good relations with Sichtermann, the Dutch, by the end of 
1736 resulted in a European alliance against the «vexations» by the 
Mughals princes. 
Dupleix started to organise a secret agreement with the Dutch and 
with the English aimed to boycott the saltpetre trade, which was in the 
hands of the Bengal Nawab; and he was successful, despite the trade 
rivalry among the three Companies being as fiery as ever, since the 
English had managed to obtain an exemption from the custom duties on 
the rice trade, which increased as a consequence the financial load on the 
                     
47 Vigié, Dupleix, op. cit., p. 135. 
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other two Companies: «Ever since the Nation has had a foothold in 
Bengal, we get our rice from Doulia; we are not going to change this 
custom at all: it has been granted to us by the decrees of the Kings and 
paravanas of the Nawabs. The other Nations have the same privilege, but 
with this difference: that the English do not pay any duties, while we and 
the Dutch have to regularly pay the Ganges duties»48. 
So it seems that from 1736-37 Dupleix managed to organise, together 
with the Dutch and the English, a «syndicate» against the Maures, always 
accused of being too greedy in extorting money from the European 
Companies. 
In the summer 1736 Dupleix wrote to the Calcutta Governor to 
present his project to prevent the Maures from selling their saltpetre in 
European-controlled ports, or to anybody who was not a subject of the 
Great Mughal. Knowing that Governor Stackhouse would be reluctant 
to accept a proposal which meant a total blockade of the Nawab’s trade 
– since the English were at that moment entertaining good relations with 
him – Dupleix underlined that neither Sicthermann’s «intention, nor 
mine own, has ever been to block trade in any part of Bengal […], but 
our plan is only that these three Nations [France, England and Holland] 
should stop buying any saltpetre owned by the Maures in all of these 
provinces»49. 
Once his plan of alliance proved successful, Dupleix wrote the news 
to his aides, without concealing his satisfaction for the practical results of 
the move: «Ali Agi Khan had to stop being happy, and I was able to 
make him sure that this ship [Dupleix was referring to a Danish trading 
                     
48 Ars., ms 4743, Dupleix’s letter to M. Burat (a French merchant), Chandernagore, 21 
April 1735, f. 9 r\v. 
49 Ars., ms 4744, Dupleix’s letter to Stackhouse, Chandernagore, 27 July 1736, f. 1v-2 r. 
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ship that had attempted to buy the Nawab’s saltpetre] will not be able to 
buy his saltpetre»50. 
The Bengali Nawab’s ships were in the end unable to find any port to 
unload their saltpetre, nor were they able to sell it to any independent 
European merchants, since they were under the pressure of the coalition 
promoted by the Chadernagore French Director. 
The Nawab, though having come to know in advance of the 
intentions of the three European companies, was not able to evade the 
combined blockade of the three European navies, which substantially 
damaged his economic interests in the region. He had tried in vain, as an 
extreme recourse, to use some men of straw for his traffics, who were to 
freight the ships belonging to the Danish Company or to private ship-
owners in order to evade, according to his plans, the checkpoints placed 
by France, England and Holland along the course of the Ganges. 
The boycott conceived by the three Companies, therefore, targeted 
the Danish – accomplices, in this case, of the Nawab – as well, and in 
this regard Dupleix recommended the utmost firmness to his agent in 
Patna: «I am persuaded that you will do all that is in your power in order 
to support the good idea; that will get you many kudos»51. 
The blockade of Bengali saltpetre was actually successful, and indeed 
Dupleix wrote that «the Danish ship did not get the permission for any 
trade, and it is completely false that it managed to buy the saltpetre from 
the Maures, and that saltpetre suffered as well from the damages of 
being left in storage for a long time»52. And again, some weeks later, 
Director Dupleix confirmed that the Maures had not been able to unload 
                     
50 Ars., ms 4744, Dupleix’s letter to M. Groiselle (a French merchant), Chandernagore, 
5 November 1736, ff. 17v-18 r. Ali Agi Kan was fossedar, a high Customs Officer of 
Nawab Shuja Khan, the Mughal Governor of Bengal. 
51 Ars., ms 4744, Dupleix’s letter to Burat, Chandernagore, 6 November 1736, f. 18 r\v. 
52 Ars., ms 4744, Dupleix’s letter to Groiselle, Chandernagore, 11 January 1737, f. 72 
r\v. 
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their saltpetre either at the French factories, «or as well at the English or 
Dutch ones»53: the Western alliance had indeed given its fruits. 
 
In conclusion, in Dupleix’s opinion, the Compagnie des Indes would 
have been able to put in practice an efficient colonial system in the 
Indian subcontinent only if the French government had resolved to lend 
its full support to a scheme of territorial and political expansion at the 
expense of the Indian principalities54. That is to say, a colonial system in 
which the French, in the long run, would have been freed from the 
constraint of having to put up with the «tantrums» of local rulers; a 
political situation, therefore, diametrically opposite to what the 
Europeans had found in Bengal in the 1730s, as we have seen. 
Therefore this episode of anti-Indian «alliance» of the three main 
European Companies in Bengal during the first decades of the 18th 
century can be considered as one of the first documented examples of 
the shift in the power relations between Europeans and Indians in 
favour of the Europeans, and it acquires a symbolic importance. Since 
then, progressively, the use of force becomes, thanks to the fear it 
generates, a normal modus operandi on the part of the European 
Companies. 
From the end of the fourth decade of the 18th century even in the 
Indian sources there is a new awareness of this situation. In the History of 
                     
53 Ars., ms 4744, Dupleix’s letter to Groiselle, Chandernagore, 2 February 1737, ff. 80v-
81r. 
54 Dupleix indeed in his Mémoire du 16 octobre 1753 (and then in the more extensive 
version of this same memorial, that he got published in 1759 in Paris, Mémoire pour le 
sieur Dupleix contre la Compagnie des Indes, op. cit.) highlights that a great trade Company 
needs to obtain steady and secure revenues from the possession of agricultural districts, 
avoiding (according to mercantilist theory) the export of gold and silver for the keeping 
of the comptoirs and for the purchase of Indian goods. See: BN, NAF, 9355, Mémoire du 
16 octobre 1753, MS by Dupleix, Pondicherry, 16 October 1753, ff. 343r-370r; and M. 
Vaghi, Alfred Martineau et la 'genèse' du protectorat. Le cas indien (1745-1761), in «French 
Colonial History», 2013, Vol. 14, pp. 71-87. 
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the Battle of Bobbili (by 19th century storyteller Peddada Mallesam55), for 
example, there are frequent references to the actions of the French 
commander in the region, Charles de Bussy56 (who started his career in 
India under the orders of Dupleix). Bussy safeguarded with force – and 
with the fear it generates – the French interests in Bengal57, and received 
continuous requests for help from the local princes (such as the king of 
Vijayanagaram who wanted to take possession of Bobbili in alliance with 
him58). 
By this example of Bussy’s policy in Bengal – of which the History of 
the Battle of Bobbili leaves a clear proof59–, we understand that Europeans 
                     
55 P. Mallesam, Bobbili Yuddha Katha, edited by Mallampalli Somasekhara Sarma, Madras, 
Oriental Library, 1956. The battle of Bobbili (1757) is one of the significant episodes in 
the history of the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh (at the time part of the suba of 
Bengal) and in the history of Anglo-French-Indian wars (1756-1763). The 
Vijayanagaram king (Pusapati Peda Vijaya Rama Raju, 1670-1756) had won the war 
against the king of Bobbili with the help of French General Bussy. The Yanam region 
was given to Bussy as a token of gratitude for the help rendered by him in the fight 
against the Bobbili's forces. See the English edition of Bobbili Yuddha Katha in: V.N. 
Rao-D. Shulman-S. Subrahmanyam, Textures of Time. Writing History in South India (1600-
1800), New York, Other Press, 2003, pp. 24-79. 
56 Charles-Joseph Patissier de Bussy (?1718?-1785) had served with distinction under 
Joseph-François Dupleix in the East Indies (receiving the Order of Saint Louis). He 
had contributed to the recovery of Pondicherry from the British in 1748. In 1782 he 
was named to lead all French military forces beyond the Cape of Good Hope; he co-
ordinated his operations with Pierre-André de Suffren and fought honourably against 
the British during the Indian campaigns of the American War of Independence. See, 
passim, A. Martineau, Bussy et l'Inde française (1720-1785), Abbeville-Paris, impr. F. 
Paillart-E. Leroux, 1935. 
57 Bussy «who has received a farmām from the Delhi Padshah and had it confirmed by 
the Golconda Nawwab: the Kalinga country, as far as Katakam [Cuttack], was given to 
Bussy as tax-farm (amūl). This includes Srikakulam and Sindhu Katakam. Intent on 
realising the revenue from this vast area, Bussy sets off from Golconda with 174,000 
troops»; Rao-Shulman-Subrahmanyam, Textures of Time, op. cit., p. 26. 
58 Ibidem, p. 24. 
59 «Bussy demands that the lord of the area – the Kondapalli sarkar – come and pay his 
respects. The two aides [of Bussy] send an urgent letter: ‘If you are sitting, come just as 
you are, still sitting, for an interview (beţhi). If you are standing, come as you stand. If 
you fail to come, your fortress will be pulverised’. Receiving this letter, the zamindar, 
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had become, by the middle of the 18th century, the main players on the 
political scene of the subcontinent. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
Surinidi Potteya, rushes to meet Bussy with many gifts – meat, eggs, butter, and foreign 
liquor – to say nothing of 400 retainers, dancing-girls, and musicians»; ibidem, p. 26. 
